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G
overnments
throughout the 
world strive for
technological
progress. Economists
agree that differences
in technological attainment are the main
cause of differences in incomes and
wealth across the world. So is it not odd
that we should even be raising the
question of how good new technology is
for jobs? If it is not good for jobs, what is
it good for? How can new technology
achieve so many good things if it is bad
for jobs?
But odd as it may seem, the question
is being asked whenever there is talk of
new technology. Adverse comment takes
different forms. Sometimes it is in
connection with the romanticised
machine-breaking of the Luddites of early
nineteenth century Britain, the skilled
workers who lost their jobs to machines.
More frequently, it is in connection with a
more boring comparison of statistics
across nations.
In the 1990s, new technology was
making American labour more productive,
employment was rising and
unemployment was falling to levels that
seemed to defy analysis. Europe’s
productivity gains were smaller but its
labour market performance was even
worse. Talk of Europe’s ‘jobless recovery’
became the vogue (though currently, it is
the United States that is going through a
jobless recovery, as explained by Richard
Freeman and William Rodgers in the last
issue of Centrepiece).
Why might new technology be bad for
jobs, despite its many other good things,
and what is in the numbers? Recent work
I have done at the CEP in collaboration
with Giovanna Vallanti and Sandra Bulli
sheds light on this question.
Ironically, it is sometimes easier for the
layperson to come up with reasons why
new technology may be bad for jobs than
it is for the trained economist. The
layperson will almost certainly think of the
Luddites’ plight or the loss of
manufacturing employment. If new
technology invents machines that can do
the job that workers are doing, then, the
argument goes, it must be bad for jobs.
But the economist will point to the
fact that new technology makes jobs more
productive. More productivity means more
wealth and more wealthy individuals
spend more. So new jobs are needed to
satisfy their new needs. As John F
Kennedy put it, ‘if men have the talent to
invent new machines that put men out of
work, they have the talent to put those
men back to work.’ The key is that 
those men need to get back to work to
produce the extra goods that a wealthier
society requires.
Of course, new technology is not
always of the kind that puts men out of
work. I am writing this article on a
machine that weighs three kilos. It cost 
my employer less than a week of my
wages and does an incredible number of
things, much more than I could ever do
with my hands and my secretary’s
typewriter before this machine was
invented. Yet neither my secretary nor I
lost our jobs. We both learned how to
work with the new technology and this
has made us more productive.
True, some workers do lose their jobs
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when new technology is invented. Not as
many workers now stand along an
assembly line as in 1936, when Charlie
Chaplin immortalised it in Modern Times.
But then not as many workers sat behind
desks in 1936 as in 1987, when Tom
Wolfe wrote The Bonfire of the Vanities.
The internet has made many airline 
ticket sellers in high streets redundant, 
but it has opened up demand for
programmers, despatch workers and
online payment administrators.
New technology replaces the 
old with the new; it brings change to the
labour market. Some jobs become 
more productive, some jobs become
obsolete and some new types of jobs are
born. The labour market of modern
societies is in a continuous state of flux
and one key reason is new technology.
New fashions, demographics and natural
phenomena also contribute to change. 
But the main reason for the big changes in
the labour market – the decline of
agricultural employment, the rise and then
decline of heavy industrial employment,
the rise of the office worker – is
technological change.
This change is good for jobs overall
because it makes the average job more
productive. But the question of
employment remains: is it also good for
the volume of employment or is a society
undergoing faster technological change
than another necessarily operating at a
lower level of employment than another?
The answer to that question is in the
numbers. Our theoretical work notes that
there are different kinds of technology and
some are good for jobs and some bad. If a
large fraction of technology is of the kind
that makes jobs obsolete, the workers
who lose their jobs will need to be re-
employed elsewhere. Although demand
for new jobs will increase in response to
the rising wealth accompanying the new
technology, job creation and the matching
of the displaced workers with the new
jobs takes time.
An economy undergoing fast
technological change needs to be
continually reallocating workers from the
industries that introduce labour-saving
technology to new industries, and the
result is likely to be higher transitional
unemployment. But if technology is
primarily of the kind that increases the
productivity of workers at their place of
employment, like the introduction of
computers in offices, people are more
likely to hold on to their jobs and
employment will on average be higher.
Our work uses statistical information
from the United States, Japan and most
countries in the European Union to
identify the kinds of technology that have
hit labour markets in the last 30 years. We
find surprising results. Virtually all
technology is of the kind that is good
both for productivity and jobs. We find 
no evidence of massive job destruction at
the level of the economy as a whole 
as a result of the introduction of 
new technology.
Even if some sectors of the economy
are adversely affected by new technology,
these adverse effects do not have an
impact on the aggregate economy. In the
last 30 years, both aggregate productivity
and aggregate employment benefited
greatly from the introduction of new
technology. Modern-day Luddites
undoubtedly get hurt because they lose
their jobs, but JFK got it essentially right:
most jobs benefit from new technology
and the few that do not are replaced by
others with no negative impact on the
volume of overall employment.
Let me give some examples of the
importance of new technology for jobs. In
the United States in the decade before
1973, ‘total factor productivity’ or TFP –
the measure of how efficiently inputs of
capital and labour are used – was growing
at about 1.9% a year. In the 20 years that
followed, TFP growth dropped to an
annual average rate of 0.8%. We estimate
that this drop was responsible for virtually
the entire rise in unemployment from
about 5% to 6.8% of the labour force.
In a similar vein, in Europe,
productivity growth dropped from nearly
4% to 1.8% a year while unemployment
went up from 2.3% to 6.6% of the labour
force. Our estimates show that just over
three percentage points of this 4.3
percentage points rise were due to the
productivity slowdown. This pattern is
repeated throughout the last 30 years.
Figure 1 shows three series for
unemployment in the United States: actual
unemployment; the unemployment trend;
and the series that would be generated if
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Figure 1:
Unemployment rates in the United States 1968-95
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Virtually all technology
that has hit labour
markets in the last 30
years is of the kind that
is good both for
productivity and jobs
productivity growth were the only
influence on unemployment. It is clear
that our simulated series tracks the trend
changes in unemployment quite well. It
misses out the short-term fluctuations that
are due to the business cycle and
government policy, which is not surprising.
But the influence of new technology on
jobs seems to be sufficiently strong to
track virtually all the underlying trends 
in unemployment.
This close correlation is not repeated in
Europe, but new technology still matters
and is still good for jobs. Figure 2 shows
the unemployment rate in Europe versus
our productivity-predicted rate. A lot more
seems to be influencing the underlying
trends in unemployment than new
technology. The economics literature has
explored the role of labour market policies
and institutional rigidities and much has
been written about them in Centrepiece
(see page 23 of this issue) and elsewhere.
Productivity growth is still an
important influence on jobs, but in Europe
we have to face the fact that a recovery of
productivity growth alone will not be able
to create enough new employment to
offset the rise in unemployment of the
previous two decades. Institutional reform
is also necessary.
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Figure 2:
Unemployment rates in the European Union 1965-98
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On its own, a recovery of
productivity growth in
Europe will not create
enough new employment
to offset the rise in
unemployment
